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This paper looks at the development of the resilience approach in EU foreign policy. Building state 
and societal resilience in the EU’s neighbourhood has been identified as one of the key priorities in 
the EU Global Strategy (2016). Here we critically analyse these developments and seek to provide an 
account of the complex dynamics within which the EU’s approach to resilience is located.  We argue 
that EU resilience-thinking is influenced by three broad dynamics – the neoliberal and Anglo-Saxon 
approaches to resilience in the sphere of global governance; the particular normative discourse of the 
EU as a certain type of global actor (the EU as a normative/liberal power); and the multilevel 
character of the EU with its complex institutional structure and path dependencies which results in 
decoupling. As a consequence, the ‘translation’ of resilience constitutes an emergent project at the 
EU level, but also brings with it new challenges. The argument will be illustrated through a study of 
the EU Global Strategy and the Joint Communication on resilience in the neighbourhood. 
 
Keywords:  EU Global Strategy, European foreign policy, decoupling, governmentality, 





The resilience approach has become a major feature of recent European foreign policy as 
well as other areas of EU policy-making such as civil protection, environmental planning 
and infrastructure protection. Building state and societal resilience in the EU’s 
neighbourhood has been identified as one of the key priorities in the EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS) (HR/VP, 2016). Resilience is promoted as the answer to a number of concerns 
regarding long-term development and short-term emergency intervention, disaster risk 
reduction, political and regional instabilities in the neighbourhood and enlargement.  
This article looks at why the EU has chosen resilience as its strategy and how this 
fits with existing EU discourses and practices. In doing so we highlight the contradictions 
and limits of resilience as it is ‘translated’ through the EU’s different institutions, actors and 
narratives. We argue that rather than clearly constituting a new paradigm in EU foreign 
policy, we can detect significant differences in understandings of resilience which are 
related to the multilevel and complex structure of the EU and institutional legacies. These 
together help explain mismatch and overlaps between the general notion of resilience and its 
application to EU foreign policy. 
Despite the relatively recent arrival of the resilience vocabulary to EU policy-
making, there has already been a lot of debate as to whether this constitutes a new ‘turn’ in 
EU foreign policy. Resilience in EU foreign policy can be seen as a new paradigm, which 
might radically transform this policy area and contribute to a more pragmatic approach 
(Juncos, 2017), the pursuit of global justice (Tonra, 2018) or the foundation for true self-
governance in the neighbourhood (Korosteleva, forthcoming). Others have described 
resilience as ‘a perfect middle-ground between over-ambitious liberal peacebuilding and the 
under-ambitious objective of stability… [that] resonates with the principled pragmatism that 
the Global Strategy embraces’ (Wagner and Anholt, 2016: 415).  
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The article proceeds by setting out what resilience is and why it has risen to 
prominence. We identify three broad dynamics that shape the emergence of resilience in EU 
discourse giving it a somewhat different character to what the above accounts might 
envision. The first is the broadly neoliberal character of current approaches to resilience in 
the sphere of global governance. The second relates to the power of the EU’s discourse and 
its self-conception as a normative actor. We suggest that the second dynamic is often at odds 
with the first. The third dynamic is the multilevel character of EU governance and the 
complexity of its institutions which mediates or ‘translates’ both of the above.   
In the following discussion, we note the broader turn in global governance and its 
neoliberal character. However, we also contrast this with the normative aspect of EU 
discourse, particularly in relation to its role as a global actor. The EU remains strongly 
wedded to liberal norms and values whose universalist character is essential to the EU’s 
narrative of being a normative power, which contrasts with the more pragmatic 
characteristics of resilience discourse. As such, the EU’s resilience turn has an emergent 
character that cannot simply be explained as global governmentality even if this is a strong 
determining factor. The multilevel character of the EU and the need for institutional 
coherence is the third factor. This leads to resilience being seen as way of promoting a joint 
and comprehensive approach. We argue, however, that this can also lead to decoupling 
where supposed adherence to norms at the international level fails to translate into changes 
in local practices. Finally, we also need to take into account different institutional features 
and path dependencies as the diffusion of new ideas like resilience ends up being translated 
through existing organizational rules and practices. 
For these reasons we are sceptical of those views of resilience that see it as 
transformative since, first, the EU’s resilience approach can be partly seen as a continuation 
of neoliberal forms of governance; and, secondly, the implementation of resilience at the EU 
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level is shaped by different discursive and institutional legacies and path dependencies that 
might prevent the institutionalization of a new paradigm. We suggest it also comes at the 
price of generating confusion and tensions between a neoliberal resilience discourse that 
emphasises transformation, adaptability and pragmatism and the more universal liberal 
norms and values that help define the EU’s identity. We suggest that the EU’s resilience turn 
is actually more about projecting a certain image of the EU as having a joint and 
comprehensive approach, but that in doing so, the resilience turn may actually create greater 
incoherence. 
The argument of the paper is supported by a range of empirical observations derived 
from documentary analysis of public and semi-confidential EU documents, participatory and 
non-participatory observation and nine interviews with EU policy-makers involved in the 
drafting of the EU’s Joint Communication on Resilience (hereafter Joint Communication). 
Triangulation of these different data sources provides a fuller account of the dynamics 
behind the adoption of a resilience approach at the EU level and the challenges connected to 
it. The empirical data find their origins in our examination of six events organised with EU 
policymakers in Brussels in 2017 on the topic of resilience, including several roundtables, 
seminars and a training event with EU officials on the same topic. These observations were 
then complemented with nine semi-structured qualitative interviews with diplomats and 
officials from the European Commission (DG ECHO and DEVCO), European External 
Action Service and EU Delegations. The interviews were conducted face-to-face and over 
the phone between September 2017 and January 2018. They are coded to maintain the 
anonymity of the interviewees.  




Resilience is an idea that seems to have emerged from nowhere. Not many years ago 
it was barely visible in policy papers except perhaps more specialist analysis of ecological 
crisis. Drawing on the arguments of writers like C.S. Holling, attention started to shift to how 
human behaviour might change in response to systemic instabilities and uncertainties. 
Holling suggests that when faced with unexpected external shocks, the constancy of a system 
is less important than the ability of its essential relationships to withstand these shocks and 
persist (1973: 1). With this understanding, focus has shifted away from the idea that we can 
or indeed should protect ourselves through adopting the correct set of policies and instead 
sees crises and shocks as enabling critical self-reflection, learning and adaptation (Berkes et 
al., 2003: 14-20). At the societal level, resilience implies the ability of communities to 
withstand external shocks through innovation, social learning and developing the capacity to 
cope with change (Adger 2000: 361). The resilience discourse is also underpinned by the 
belief that complex life is no longer bound by fixed laws or structures. Therefore, we cannot 
rely on the certainties of rational behaviour or prediction. The discourse of resilience seeks 
governance through complexity and uncertainty placing emphasis on the contingent, unstable 
and unknowable character of reality.  
To understand resilience as a form of governance is to examine developments in 
policy-making aimed at promoting strategies of learning and adaptation, making communities 
and individuals more reflexive and self-aware and fostering individual and community self-
governance, self-reliance and responsibility. We might talk of this as ‘governing through 
complexity’ (Chandler, 2014). Critical scholars of resilience have noted how resilience 
promotes strategies of learning and adaptation in order to shift emphasis, or responsibility, 
from states onto populations so that they are better able to govern themselves (Evans and 
Reid, 2014, Mavelli, 2016). Its usefulness to policy-makers derives from its ability to play a 
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certain role in managing or governing populations from a distance, through ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ (Foucault, 2008). 
This Foucauldian argument has dominated the more critical understandings of 
resilience which see it as an attempt to try and embed a set of neoliberal norms of behaviour 
and self-governance (Walker and Cooper, 2011). We can summarise the neoliberal 
understanding of resilience as based on certain key features. It promotes governance from a 
distance, using techniques of facilitation and monitoring (Joseph, 2014). It seeks to devolve 
responsibility for being resilient and managing crises and places strong emphasis on the role 
of civil society and the private sector. This understanding of resilience also embraces 
neoliberal ideas of the market and enterprising behaviour. It encourages initiative and 
enterprise in the face of challenges, and sees crises and disasters as transformative 
opportunities. The resilient subject is to be considered according to its resourcefulness and 
ability to cope in the face of adversity and even its willingness to take advantage of 
opportunities that crises might present (Evans and Reid, 2014). The UK is a prime example 
of how this approach to resilience can be applied to the governance of domestic populations 
with resilience playing a prominent role in civil contingencies strategy, but also in the UK’s 
international development strategy (DFID, 2011).  
 In what follows, we take account of this close relation between resilience and 
neoliberal approaches to governance, but also argue that account needs to be taken of the 
way that resilience is developed within the complex ensemble of EU institutions. Rejecting 
the view that resilience is an entirely new discourse and set of practices, we argue the need 
to see resilience in relation to already existing – but evolving – discourses, as well as more 
material social structures, practices and institutional frameworks. This means looking at the 
general dynamics behind the global resilience turn to take into account the specific issues 
connected to the EU as an institutional ensemble (Jessop 2004), comprised of competing 
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ideas and interests across multiple scales. Such an approach can shed light on the 
implementation of this putative new ‘turn’ in EU foreign policy.  
While many accounts of resilience in international relations see it as neoliberal 
governmentality (see above), drawing on organisational theory allows us to illuminate the 
ways in which new ideas (such as resilience) diffuse and are institutionalised in different 
organisational settings. In other words, the neoliberal approach to resilience is not just 
adopted at the EU level, instead it is adapted, ‘edited’ or ‘translated’ (Sahlin and Wedlin, 
2008). Two insights are of particular relevance here. The first one is that of path dependency 
which acknowledges that institutions are never created in a vacuum, i.e. there is no tabula 
rasa, but that the diffusion and institutionalisation of new ideas build upon previous 
institutional configurations. Analyses that take political interactions as a ‘one-shot 
interaction’ miss this point, as well as the fact that historical development can trap actors in 
concrete dynamics. This means that not only does history matter, but what also matters is the 
particular sequence of events. External forces will not have the same result in every period; 
previous political outcomes will determine the impact of current external forces and then a 
specific historical development or ‘path’ (Hay and Wincott, 1998; Pierson, 2000: 251). The 
existence of these institutional legacies will favour some decisions and exclude others, 
eventually, shaping the political outcome. Path dependency also implies that particular 
courses of action, once introduced, can be difficult to reverse. Institutions are ‘sticky’ or 
resistant to change. What is more, path dependency is self-reinforcing in the sense that steps 
in one direction induce more steps in the same direction (Pierson, 2000: 252).  
Linked to this is the second key concept, that of decoupling which we understand 
here in relation to how supposed adherence to approaches and norms at the international 
level fails to translate into transformative changes in local practices, resulting in particular 
problems of compliance and configuration (Gizelis and Joseph 2016: 5). As a consequence 
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of institutional legacies and path dependencies, the diffusion of new ideas such as resilience 
never takes place as expected; instead their implementation is mediated by existing 
organisational rules and practices which lead to decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Decoupling also results from the fact that, although organisations seek to adopt institutional 
myths as part of their organisational agendas and policies as a way to maintain legitimacy 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977), they rarely possess the resources or willingness to fully align 
their institutional practice with new organisational discourses.  
As a result of these competing logics, what we observe is that resilience discourses 
have been generally adopted in EU foreign policy from development to security policies, but 
the institutionalisation of these discourses continues to be very limited (or shallow) since full 
institutionalisation would require an overhaul of the EU’s institutional architecture and a 
rethinking of its main rationale for intervention. It would also require full agreement among 
member states, EU institutions and other relevant actors, many of whom have strong, often 
conflicting, interests in this area. This is compounded by the fact that there is no clear 
agreement as to what the concept of resilience means in practice both among academics and 
practitioners, making the process of ‘editing’ or translation into institutional programmes 
and policies even more difficult (Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Garshagen, 2013: 41). The 
following sections apply these theoretical insights to explain the overall adoption of 
resilience approaches at the EU level, but also the precise ways in which they have been 
adopted/translated in practice.  
The neoliberal aspects of EU resilience 
In this section we look at those aspects of the EU’s approach that might be 
considered similar to neoliberal governmentality, particularly the focus on building 
resilience at the individual and community level. According to one the interviewees, 
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‘resilience is not a new objective, but a way of operating – resilience as an approach, more 
specifically, a transversal approach, one that focuses on risk identification, endogenous 
capacities, dealing with communities and individuals, but also a political and strategic 
approach’ (Interview 2). Another interviewee explained that ‘the general concept is about 
building the ability of the individual, the community, the country to cope and recover from 
stresses and shocks. This concept has been at the core of work of ECHO and DEVCO for 
the last few years.’ The ‘resilience marker’ is particularly well established in EU 
development and humanitarian policies (Interviews 2, 3, 6). Others identify the need to 
adopt a ‘systems approach’ (Interviews 2, 9); a ‘bottom up’ approach (Interview 3); focusing 
on local ‘capacities’ and not just vulnerabilities (Interviews 2, 3, 7). 
The EU’s approach to resilience represents a turn away from full intervention in 
favour of more distant approaches that shift responsibility away from the international 
community onto local actors (Joseph, 2014; Pospisil and Besancenot, 2014). This operates 
under the positive guise of local ownership and capacity building and invokes a progressive 
discourse of empowerment (Interviews 2, 3; Juncos, 2017). Resilience appeals to individual 
interests, to civil society, and to national leadership. However, this is done according to a 
global template that is decided not at the grass roots level, but among international 
organisations, NGOs, donor organisations and other international actors. The EU’s approach 
to resilience claims to help ‘partner countries’ by embedding the right policies into their 
national development strategies and promoting people-centred approaches (European 
Commission, 2013: 3; HR/VP, 2016). This is specifically framed as capacity to adapt. The 
EU recognises the leading role of partner countries while effectively telling them what their 
practices should be. This includes such contested notions as promoting public-private 
partnerships and better engagement with global markets (European Commission, 2012: 9; 
HR/VP, 2016: 26; Commission and HR, 2017: 6).  
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An institutional approach that works from a distance by seeking to implement 
various forms of benchmarking, standards, peer review and knowledge dissemination is 
consistent with recent internal EU governance strategies such as the Lisbon strategy and 
Open Method of Coordination and external ones such as the enlargement process. These 
work by attempting to tighten up mechanisms and procedures, while also appearing more 
laissez faire and distant in their manner of intervention. Many even claim that the EU was 
already doing resilience-building, but it did not call it that way (Interview 3). Hence, 
resilience constitutes another example of ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Interview 1; de Milliano 
and Jurriens, 2016: 86). 
The arguments above can be found underpinning the strategies of key international 
organisations, most notably the UN (UN/ISDR: 2008), OECD (2008), and the World Bank 
(2013) and, as such, one can argue that resilience is now a core part of a modern 
international administration paradigm for overseas intervention (Garschagen, 2013). In this 
respect, the EU’s resilience approach is consistent with a trend across a range of 
international organisations concerning how best to organise international intervention 
(Interviews 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9). In developing the new Joint Communication, the EU has 
‘borrowed’ from these existing approaches, namely, that of the UN (Interviews 1, 2). As the 
new Joint Communication states, ‘[t]he EU has an interest in developing a shared 
understanding and practice around resilience’ with other international partners, including the 
UN, the World Bank and the OECD (Commission and HR, 2017: 21-22; Interview 2). This 
new approach is generally packaged as a way to promote more cost-effective interventions, 
with downscaled goals based on ‘best fit’ solutions (European Commission, 2012: 3). Yet, 
the diffusion of these ideas and its adoption at the EU level needs to be seen not just from 
the perspective of (rational) cost-effective interventions, but as a way for the EU to maintain 
its legitimacy as an international actor in line with the EU’s multilateralist approach and its 
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desire to be ‘perceived’ as an effective and legitimate international actor (Interview 2). This 
leads to some divergence from the neoliberal approaches dominant among other 
international organisations. The following section explores two more dimensions of this 
process of decoupling. 
 
Translating the resilience discourse: path dependence and decoupling 
While at the global level resilience is embedded in neoliberal discourses and governance 
from a distance, within the EU the process is conditioned by meso-level dynamics such as 
different institutional features and path dependencies, often resulting in a process of 
decoupling. There are two aspects to this process of decoupling. One is linked to the nature 
of the EU’s own liberal (structural) foreign policy. The second one has more to do with the 
EU’s specific organisational properties which constrain the adoption and implementation of 
a resilience approach.  
 
The EU’s liberal foreign policy: in search of an identity 
Firstly, the EU’s liberal foreign policy shapes the way the EU has translated the resilience 
approach into EU discourses and policies. While resilience might suggest a post-liberal 
(Chandler, 2014), more pragmatic approach (Juncos, 2017) or a middle ground between 
liberal peacebuilding and stability (Wagner and Anholt, 2016), the EU’s narrative is still 
closely wedded to liberal norms and values of a more universalist character. Although the 
EUGS recognizes that other non-liberal ‘paths’ might be possible (HR/VP, 2016: 25-26), the 
Joint Communication explicitly states that ‘[t]his work will be grounded in the EU’s 
commitment to democracy and human and fundamental rights’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 
4). As one of the interviewees argued, ‘the promotion of the EU’s core values is intrinsic to 
resilience. If we do not respect these values, we won’t be resilient (Interview 1). The 
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promotion of liberal values constitutes the raison d’être of the EU’s foreign policy and this 
shapes the way the EU understands resilience. As such, the EU’s resilience turn continues to 
be liberal rather than post-liberal or pragmatic. 
Whereas in the literature resilience is associated with characteristics such as 
adaptability, diversity, bottom up approaches, and the ability to work with uncertainty to 
mention but a few (Chandler, 2014), being democratic or respecting human rights are not 
among these features. By contrast, the EU’s approach seeks to promote a set of universal 
values through resilience-building and portrays a world driven by universal laws, and hence 
susceptible to human intervention. The Joint Communication identifies the following 
(universal) liberal values: ‘respect for democracy, rule of law, human and fundamental 
rights and fosters inclusive long-term security and progress’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 3; 
see also HR/VP, 2016: 13). All this chimes well with the idea of Normative Power Europe 
(Manners, 2002) and that of Liberal Power Europe, which also applies to the economic 
sphere (Wagner, 2017). A resilient EU requires free markets and access to reliable energy-
producing and transit countries (HR/VP, 2016: 22). 
One of the key consequences of this self-understanding as a normative or liberal 
power is that resilience is understood as a process rather than as an end in itself (Bourbeau 
and Ryan, 2017). This is explicitly acknowledged in the Joint Communication as the first 
‘guiding consideration for a strategic approach to resilience’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 
23). By strengthening resilience, the EU seeks to secure progress towards its own liberal 
goals. Resilience-building is intentionally seeking change, but this change closely follows a 
liberal strategy. According to the EUGS, ‘[a] resilient society featuring democracy, trust in 
institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state’ (HR/VP, 2016: 
24). Yet, the new resilience thinking also implies a humbler view about the ability of the 
EU, and generally the West, to shape the world especially compared to the 2003 European 
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Security Strategy (European Council, 2003; Tocci, 2017: 62). Now, it is more about ‘shared 
responsibility’ between developed and developing countries (Interview 2).  
There is also a realisation that the promotion of values alone will not be enough to 
ensure the EU’s prosperity and security; the EU needs to promote its interests too (Interview 
1; 2). Hence, the EUGS advocates a new guiding paradigm for the EU’s foreign policy that 
of ‘principled pragmatism’ (HR/VP, 2016; Juncos, 2017). The emphasis on resilience thus 
denotes a change in the EU’s normative approach towards a more pragmatic approach 
(Interview 7, 9), but this does not mean that the EU should privilege stability over 
democracy or other liberal values. According to one official, ‘we have seen some people that 
say resilience is the new word for stability. But as long as we put people first, as long as we 
put democracy and people’s rights first, there is no tension’ (Interview 9; also 8). Those 
values are still at the core of the EU’s external action, they are just implemented in a more 
flexible manner:  
we still care about broader values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights, 
however this is more flexibly interpreted. For instance, when it comes to 
economic resilience. Five years ago, if we wanted to promote macroeconomic 
reforms we would have said ‘there is the acquis’, but not today. (Interview 2).  
There exists another disconnect (or decoupling) between the liberal timescape of EU foreign 
policy and that required by resilience approaches. While the EU’s liberal understanding of 
international relations is still based on a linear temporal timescape of transformation and 
modernisation (Holden, 2016: 416-18), this clashes with the assumptions of complexity and 
uncertainty of resilience-thinking. One visible outcome of this tension is the hesitations in 
the official documents between acknowledging uncertainty and the belief that we can still 
control/stop/prevent events from happening (HR/VP, 2016: 3, 7; Commission and HR, 
2017: 3). In contrast to more neoliberal understandings, complexity and uncertainty are 
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feared rather than embraced as an opportunity (EEAS, 2015). The Joint Communication 
does recognise that ‘development, and progress towards democracy, peace and security, is 
not a linear process’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 23; 17). Nonetheless, there remains a 
belief in the human ability to promote modernisation and progress towards liberal values: 
‘the challenge now is how to sustain progress in the transformational agenda the EU has set 
itself, against a backdrop of a more connected, contested and complex global environment.’ 
(Commission and HR, 2017: 2). Resilience is not about maintaining the status quo, but 
about promoting changes, which sometimes might also be disruptive (e.g. administrative 
reforms linked to the fight against corruption) (Interview 1). This disconnect between the 
EU’s timescape and resilience approaches is compounded by the EU’s own institutional 
timescapes (see next section).  
This leads to another point concerning the fit between resilience and the EU’s 
international identity. While the argument above suggests that the EU’s self-understanding 
as a liberal/normative power has shaped the way it understands (and implements) resilience, 
it is also important to note that this self-understanding also helps explain how/why the EU 
might find the concept of resilience an appropriate one in that resilience gives the 
impression the EU is exercising a form of power that is consistent with its own nature as an 
entity. It is noted by certain analysts that the EU places greater emphasis on things like 
regional integration, local ownership and capacity building, all things that fit with a 
resilience approach (Richmond et al., 2011; Juncos, 2017). The resilience turn thus gives 
new meaning to the ‘sui generis’ argument by supporting the idea of the EU acting as a 
normative/liberal power. Even if not true, resilience gives the appearance of being a form of 
soft power that differs from US approaches. External perceptions are vital for the EU’s role 
as a normative power (Larsen, 2014) and that explains why the EU might favour the term 
resilience over other alternative terms such as stability/stabilisation, which other 
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international actors such as Russia or the US might prefer. Moreover, as several officials 
explained, external partners are more prone to accept the term resilience, while they do not 
want to be labelled/associated with other terms such as fragile or failed states (Interview 1; 
9; EU-CIVCAP, 2017a: 7)  
Yet, the EU’s resilience approach is as much about transforming the outside and 
external perceptions of the EU as it is about shaping the EU itself by developing a more 
political and strategic foreign policy (Commission and HR, 2017). Ultimately, it is an 
attempt by the EU to develop a more coherent and integrated foreign policy (Interview 6). It 
is to the question of EU coherence and its link to resilience that the next section turns.   
 
The EU’s institutional framework: in the search for a more coherent foreign policy 
Resilience is often presented as a way to promote a more joint and comprehensive approach 
to tackling global threats. Linked to adaptive systems theory, resilience thinking puts 
forward a view of the world whereby different sectors (humanitarian, development, foreign 
policy) and different real-world events are intrinsically connected. As an umbrella approach, 
‘[r]esilience is employed to bring together perceptions, experiences, knowledge and interests 
from different fields for policy-making, planning and decision-making’ (de Milliano and 
Jurriens, 2016: 86). A silo mentality or box thinking is fundamentally at odds with 
resilience.  
From this perspective, a significant reason for the EU’s interest in a resilience turn is 
the clear perception that the EU needs a far more coordinated strategy to managing conflicts 
and crises in its neighbourhood. Resilience-building therefore comes into the picture as a 
means of doing this, emphasising coordination between actors across different levels or 
scales and offering a bridge between crisis response and longer-term development 
(Interviews 2, 6). While in the past resilience was circumscribed to development and 
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humanitarian aid, the EUGS and the Joint Communication extend the ‘resilience approach’ 
to the whole EU external relations system, broadening the ownership of the concept 
(Interview 2, 6, 7; EU-CIVCAP, 2017b). Resilience-building seeks to promote joint action 
between humanitarian, development, environmental and security policies as well as between 
internal and external security policies (Commission and HR/VP, 2; 15). According to 
Nathalie Tocci, the penholder of the EUGS, ‘resilience is a term that speaks to two policy 
communities which the EUGS sought to bring together: the security community and the 
development community’ (Tocci, 2017: 70; also Wagner and Anholt, 2016). Hence, there is 
a clear link between resilience and different initiatives on a comprehensive/integrated 
approach (Commission and HR, 2013; HR/VP, 2016). By engaging in resilience-building 
projects, a view of the EU can be projected that helps disguise or even resolve some of its 
own internal tensions and contradictions. Developing a more coherent foreign policy, even if 
only in certain areas of activity, builds confidence in the idea of the EU as global actor. 
Given the significant differences between member states’ interests and bureaucratic 
rivalries, a notion like resilience can perhaps play an important role in presenting a more 
coherent and united approach to external action. 
However, despite this emphasis on comprehensiveness and coherence, a number of 
studies have shown that silos and lack of integration between different actors and 
organisations remain (di Milliano and Jurriens, 2016: 87). In the case of the EU, this 
problem is exacerbated by the EU’s institutional configuration, which prevents this from 
happening in a meaningful way in practice. Consequently, while the uptake of resilience by 
the EU is intended to bridge the gaps in policy, unintended consequences might have the 
opposite effect (EU-CIVCAP, 2017b). Some of these problems are illustrated by EU 
development and humanitarian policies.  
 
17 
In contrast to development aid which is conditional, humanitarian aid is meant to be 
an automatic entitlement. ECHO, the EU’s Directorate-General (DG) for European Civil 
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, claims to focus on providing apolitical 
emergency assistance. However, the introduction of resilience into the equation challenges 
this approach. For instance, one interviewee explained that ‘the humanitarian community 
and the development community are still two different voices, the objectives are not always 
the same, this is why they have different portfolios, different objectives, different 
instruments (financial, etc.)’ (Interview 6). The emergence of resilience thinking is meant to 
help bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and development by linking emergency aid to 
longer-term preparedness, but by doing this, it might also hinder the impartiality, neutrality 
and independence of EU humanitarian aid if humanitarian actors are perceived as following 
any political and security considerations (Interview 6). There is always a risk that a political 
approach to resilience building might endanger the ‘humanitarian space’, although so far this 
has not had an impact on EU humanitarian actors on the ground (Interviews 8, 9).  
The EU’s approach also remains divided between short-term intervention and 
longer-term programmes with different departments and mechanisms. While the Joint 
Communication points at the need to increase synergies and coordination between different 
policy areas (Commission and HR, 2017: 7), underneath this rhetoric are growing 
inconsistencies and divided interests over whether development and humanitarian assistance 
can or should be kept separate. For instance, an interviewee noted that while many member 
states have humanitarian and development affairs integrated within the same ministry, at the 
EU level ‘we have a very separate system, with ECHO having a separate commissioner 
[and] DEVCO having its own commissioner […] on top of that, we have a foreign and 
security unit, which is also a separate entity [the EEAS]’ (Interview 7). These tensions are 
not only encouraged by the distinct mandates established by the Treaties which prevent 
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further integration of development, humanitarian and foreign policies, but also due to the 
existence of different communities of practice with their own interests and ways of doing 
things (Interviews 3, 6, 7).  
Different officials (those working on development, humanitarian and security/foreign 
policy) have different interpretations of resilience which also shape the way they implement 
this concept in practice (de Milliano and Jurriens, 2016, 86). The interviewees referred to the 
existence of different ‘understandings’, ‘roles’, ‘cultures’ and even ‘communities’ and, more 
generally, ‘an inbuilt difference in the way we do things which also impinges on the 
implementation of resilience’. (Interviews 1, 6, 7, 9). This is one of the reasons why the 
Joint Communication does not put forward a single definition; instead it refers to both 
Commission documents and the EUGS (Commission and HR, 2017: 3). The difference in 
perception between different EU institutions are not just semantic in nature, but deeper in 
nature. As acknowledged by Tocci, ‘resilience often means different things to these two 
groups’, with the development community emphasising more ‘the developmental, including 
psychological, dimensions of resilience’ (2017: 70). While those dealing with humanitarian 
and development policies are more familiar and more inclined to accept a resilience 
discourse (Interviews 3, 6), those dealing with foreign policy and security policies have 
often prioritised stability and are more sceptical of a resilience approach . Not surprisingly, 
the revised ENP strategy still asserts that ‘the new ENP will take stabilisation as its main 
political priority’ (Commission and HR, 2015, 2; Interview 1), although it also concedes that 
building resilience in the neighbourhood is an important, if only second-order, goal. Others 
have also pointed out at the tensions resulting from the EU’s intention to promote resilience 
at the individual, societal, but also at the state level (Tonra, 2018). Development and 




State resilience and community resilience are not the same. Prioritising the former 
puts an emphasis on security and stability that can limit legitimate grass-roots 
movements for development and change, opening the door to civil society 
repression. (VOICE, 2017: 4).  
Linked to the problem of institutional coordination is that of bureaucratic politics – with 
different organisations using resilience as a way to increase their own competences and 
resources – which might also get in the way of the implementation of a resilience approach. 
The development of a resilience strategy thus reveals divisions between actors belonging to 
different departments within the EU such as ECHO, DEVCO and EEAS, as well as 
divisions within departments like ECHO over their role and function. These actors have 
their own strategic interests linked to institutional incentives, bureaucratic conditioning and 
role identities. Despite its claims to be a bridging approach, the EU’s resilience strategy has 
particular unintended institutional and strategic consequences, revealing divisions of actors 
and interests that are multi-scalar and institutionally complex. 
Finally, there are more concrete institutional features of the EU’s foreign policy 
system that work against the implementation of a resilience approach. The consensus-
building nature of the EU foreign-policy decision-making tends to make the adoption of 
decisions slow. The fragmentation of EU financial instruments and burdensome 
procurement rules have also been criticised for negatively affecting the responsiveness of 
aid delivery and the implementation of its civilian and military operations (Interviews 3, 7, 
9; European Commission, 2017). One official described the current approach as ‘instrument 
driven’, which is fundamentally at odds with the resilience approach (Interview 2). Another 
interviewee added: ‘when it comes to the Commission, financial procedures and instruments 
are never quick or flexible enough. We require more flexible instruments that have mixed 
purposes (e.g. both with humanitarian and development aims)’ (Interview 3). It is not 
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surprising that some of the key lessons from previous EU resilience programmes include 
‘the need for longer term programming cycles (including planning of humanitarian aid) 
combined with short term flexibility, and the need for contingency financing arrangements 
to address potential disruptive pressures and shocks’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 21). 
These problems are also linked to the different EU timescapes: EU budgetary programmes 
are multiannual and project-specific preventing the implementation of resilience approaches, 
which require adaptability, flexibility, etc. The new resilience approach thus requires an 
overhaul of the EU’s foreign policy machinery, including programming and financing. 
However, this is particularly difficult given that the EU is currently half way through a 
programming cycle (Interviews 1, 2, 7). According to one official, EU officials will not be 
willing to adopt a new approach unless there are some incentives in return, but the resilience 
approach is a long-term process and it is difficult to incorporate such incentives in the short-
term (Interview 2). The new approach requires learning new ways of doing things:  
We are having to learn how do you do joint proposals, joint analyses […] we are 
working out how we work with ourselves and also other partners, including whether 
national government, local government, the IFIs… working with a more holistic 
system based approach. (Interview 9). 
Another interviewee added that ‘this will only mean more work and then it becomes a new 
burden. If this is imposed, it won’t work’ (Interview 1). The Joint Communication also 
suggests that ‘[a]ll this requires a rethink of the EU’s problem analysis and design of 
programmes, as well as of the methods of assessment of the sustainability of EU’s 
interventions.’ (Commission and HR, 2017: 18). Yet, as shown in the literature, 
organisations are usually reluctant to large-scale change or innovation; at most what we 




The EU’s resilience approach and member state level projects 
The last part of the analysis draws attention to contestation at the domestic level where 
understandings and interpretations of resilience might be affected by different interests, 
identities and political dynamics preventing the implementation of a new paradigm/turn in 
EU foreign policy. As argued above, generally it could be said that the EU’s approach to 
governance broadly reflects a neoliberal rationality that promotes market mechanisms and 
uses competitiveness as a benchmarking tool (Joseph, 2014). However, the situation inside 
the EU is somewhat different to Anglo Saxon countries like the US and UK insofar as 
neoliberal policies are not fully hegemonic inside the Union and are up against powerful 
counter-models and rival hegemonic projects. While the UK model has been very influential 
in the area of EU development policy and it has shaped the overall EU approach to 
resilience, Brexit means that UK influence in the making of EU foreign policy has 
diminished in recent years (certainly during the drafting of the Joint Communication) and 
will be more so the case in the future. Therefore, EU policy-making reflects a fight going on 
inside the EU between different approaches to governance and consequently different 
interpretations of strategies like resilience.  
While EU member states might be supportive of the resilience agenda as a whole 
(Interviews 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9), they are divided over neoliberal strategy and what are perceived 
as Anglo-Saxon methods of governance when applied to areas of EU policy. This is clear 
from disagreements over financial regulation and economic reform, tensions on employment 
reform to flexibilise labour practices and the significant failure by member states to comply 
with the Lisbon strategy. Although with overseas development policies, these divisions are 
less significant (Interviews 6, 9), the modalities of EU foreign and security policy in the 
neighbourhood remain a very controversial subject (for instance, regarding how to deal with 
Russia). The evidence thus suggests that while the bulk of the EU’s resilience approach 
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might be neoliberal in nature (see above), the emergent outcome is more complex than this 
because of Brexit and the existence of competing approaches at the national level.  
Continental discourses of resilience (e.g. in France or Germany) place more 
emphasis on the relation between states and societies, where the state has a responsibility for 
protecting the population, with the legitimacy of state action rooted in society as a whole 
(Joseph, 2017). For instance, for some French officials, resilience was translated into 
‘résistance: a word with very obvious security connotations’ (Tocci, 2017: 70) and quite 
different from the Anglo-Saxon focus on adaptability. These competing understandings of 
resilience – some more individualistic, some more state-societal, some more adaptable, 
some more robust – are reflected and filtered through EU documents. A quick glance at the 
EUGS and the Joint Communication shows that while the individual and communities are 
mentioned in a few places, the main focus is on states and societies as per continental 
(Franco-German) approaches. Also revealing is the fact that in contrast to developments in 
Anglo-Saxon approaches which suggest that full protection is no longer possible and that a 
shift to a strategy of resilience is necessary to deal with increasingly ineffective forms of 
protection, deterrence and intervention, the EUGS still argues that protection (i.e. ‘the 
Security of our Union’) constitutes the main objective. Finally, while the need for adaptation 
and transformation is mentioned in both the EUGS and the Joint Communication, in the case 
of economic resilience and infrastructure resilience, the emphasis is on robustness and 
coping rather than adapting. Resilience, is also understood somewhat conservatively in the 
EUGS as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering 
from internal and external crises’ (HR/VP, 2016: 23).   
Other interviewees noted significant differences among the member states in the way 
they understood resilience regarding external vs internal security; soft vs hard power; and 
regional vs global approaches (Interviews 1, 2, 8, 9). For some this might mean promoting 
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rule of law; for others the focus should be on protecting critical infrastructures or 
cybersecurity (Interview 1). The big donors (UK, Germany, France) and the Nordic 
countries were said to be more actively engaged in the discussions about promoting external 
resilience in development and humanitarian policies (Interview 7). The member states also 
have different views as to what capacity building means in the context of promoting 
resilience in the neighbourhood and EU security policies (Interviews 4, 5). As summarised 
by one interviewee: 
Some of them put more emphasis on the internal dimension of resilience 
(infrastructures, hybrid threats), especially in the context of the crises in the East. 
Others focus more on the external dimension of resilience. Some again are more 
interested in promoting resilience in the neighbourhood; others have a broader 
approach. For instance, some member states have supported the resilience agenda 
because they see this as a counter-balance to the discussions on security and defence, 
as a way to develop the EU’s role as a soft power. (Interview 2). 
More importantly, as noted by some interviewees (Interviews 1, 2), the ambiguities 
surrounding the EU’s discourse on resilience allow for these different understandings to be 
accommodated into this emergent European project (also Wagner and Anholt, 2016), but at 
the cost of coherence.  
Conclusion 
At first sight, the adoption of resilience at the EU level can be hailed as a new turn towards a 
more pragmatic, adaptive and locally-owned foreign policy. A closer look shows that, in 
fact, EU resilience-thinking is influenced by three broad dynamics – the neoliberal and 
Anglo-Saxon approaches to resilience in the sphere of global governance; the particular 
normative discourse of the EU as a certain type of global actor; and the multilevel character 
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of the EU with its complex institutional structure and path dependencies. The neoliberal 
approach has a more pragmatic and individualist character, whereas the EU’s normative 
approach is more universalist. The EU’s institutional structure mediates or ‘translates’ these 
in various ways. The outcomes are varied. 
The neoliberal influence, in line with governmentality analyses, can be characterised as 
operating from a distance while locking governments and their populations into a regulative 
network of external monitoring that seeks to ensure compliance on key economic and 
security issues. It works through the responsibilisation of their action using, the promotion 
of partnership, ownership, stakeholding, appeal to civil society, calls for good governance 
and an engagement in networks and peer reviews. This is a politics that presents itself in 
terms of persuasion rather than coercion, enablement rather than constraint, partnership 
rather than command.  
Examination of the EU’s own self-understanding and institutional configuration 
reveals the contradictions and limits of the EU’s resilience turn. Firstly, this has to do with 
the EU’s own international identity, which limits a turn towards a more pragmatic or post-
liberal foreign policy. In promoting resilience and strengthening local capacities, the EU can 
be presented as exercising a special form of power that is in line with the existing 
understanding of the EU as a liberal or normative power. This would also fit with the 
comprehensive security model outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, while causing fewer tensions 
between member states. However, the EU’s support for its core (universal) liberal values sits 
at odds with an understanding of resilience-building as non-linear, pragmatic and bottom-up. 
Institutional fragmentation in relation to funding, programming and implementing actors 
also results in decoupling. Finally, the contested nature of resilience is also the result of 
different understandings of resilience and competing hegemonic projects at the national 
level across the member states. This emergentist approach whereby the policy outcome (or 
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adopted strategy) is the product of contestation among different projects and understandings 
is reflected both in the EUGS and the Joint Communication.  
More generally, the adoption of resilience-building as a strategy reflects both the 
actual weakness of the EU and an awareness of this among key actors. The EU position 
appears to be contradictory. The empirical evidence reveals an obsession with developing a 
more integrated, better coordinated, more connected and better engaged approach. Yet, at 
the same time, the EU’s discourse on resilience moves in a different direction by advocating 
that the EU plays a somewhat distant role, operating at arm’s length, cutting back on 
financial commitments, working through NGOs and arguing that affected states need to take 
responsibility for developing their own resilience strategies. Resilience allows the EU to 
commit to a more integrated approach, while placing the onus on local authorities to carry it 
out. Resilience gives the impression of being part of an integrated and holistic strategy 
without there actually being one. The resilience discourse is paradoxically more holistic and 
less engaged. The EU is better able to do this because it is possible to hide its inability to act 
coherently at the international level behind more plausible claims to be exercising normative 
or soft power. However, this is not really what a Global Strategy should be about. 
In conclusion, the resilience turn is largely about projection. While the approach of 
the EU fits with a general turn in global governance, resilience helps project an image of the 
EU as a normative actor with a coherent strategy. Unfortunately, while it is good at 
projecting an image, resilience does little to address the underlying divisions among member 
states and between different actors inside different EU institutions. Indeed, it may make 
things worse. While succeeding in making the outside world look more complex, it 
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